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Abstract 
This study is a comprehensive, empirical analysis of the linkages between governance, 
institutions, and regional infrastructure. The empirical results indicate that governance and 
institutions are crucial for regional infrastructure development: every one point improvement 
in governance results in a 1 to 1.5 point rise in regional infrastructure. Countries (and 
regions) with higher income, stronger institutions, better governance, and more open 
economies are likely to have higher levels of regional infrastructure. The findings of this 
paper suggest that our efforts to promote regional infrastructure must not be limited to 
traditional policy measures aimed at attracting investment in infrastructure, but must also 
address policy reform across a number of areas. Thus, institutions and governance must 
play an important complementary role in strengthening Asia’s regional infrastructure. 
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While economic growth can occur in the short run with autocratic regimes, 
long run economic growth entails the development of rule of law. 
~ Douglass C. North 
Nobel Prize Lecture, 9 December 1993 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to the ongoing global economic and financial crisis, governments around the 
world have pledged to spend trillions of dollars on infrastructure over the next few years. 
This expenditure is likely to roll out intensively between 2009 and 2015. As Gerritsen (2009: 
1) noted: “This great infrastructure boom will create winners and losers. Losers will squander 
infrastructure spending on corruption and ineptitude. Winners will create powerful new 
engines of economic growth for generations to come based on new energy, globally 
competitive health care and strong educations.”  
The institutional and software components of regional infrastructure are just as important as 
the hardware components (Asian Development Bank [ADB] 2008; Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2009; United Nations [UN] 2009). Europe’s 
experience suggests that improved governance and institutions along with favorable policies 
can facilitate the development of regional infrastructure, resulting in greater prosperity and 
stability for countries in the region (ADB-ADBI 2009).  
Broadly defined, institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions (North 1990). They exist to reduce uncertainties that arise 
from asymmetric information. Formal institutions are typically imposed by rulers, parliaments, 
and bureaucracies. The outcome of their actions can broadly be defined as governance, 
which can either be good or bad governance. In other words, governance can be defined as 
the process by which decisions are made and implemented. Governance is the outcome of 
institutions (good or bad).  
This paper focuses on the role of governance in regional infrastructure development. It aims 
to explore whether governance is an essential prerequisite for building effective 
infrastructure, by:  
(i)  assessing the empirical relationship between governance and infrastructure; 
(ii)  estimating the relative strength (and intensity) of factors—including governance 
and institutions—that influence infrastructure development; and 
(iii)  assessing the impact of governance and its components on regional 
infrastructure development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background of the 
study and explores the linkages between institutions, governance, and integration. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology, while Section 4 reviews the literature on governance 
and infrastructure development. Section 5 defines the governance index and its 
components, and presents an analysis of the performance of Asian countries in a global 
perspective. Section 6 discusses measurement issues and analyzes the empirical 
relationship between governance and infrastructure, while Section 7 presents the 
econometric models and estimation results. Section 8 concludes.  
2.  INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE, AND GROWTH: 
EMPIRICAL LINKAGES 
Various studies have demonstrated that institutional quality is crucial for economic and social 
development. For example, Adam Smith (1776) noted that private contracting (institutional 
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quality) is an important prerequisite for the mutually beneficial exchanges that promote 
specialization, innovation and growth—the main factors leading to gains from trade. More 
recent empirical studies have revealed that institutional quality is associated with (i) higher 
economic growth and income levels (Campos and Nugent 1998; Barro 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Lee and Kim 2009); (ii) higher public and private investment 
(Knack and Keefer 1995; Rodrik 2003; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych 2005); (iii) 
improvements in the stock of human capital (Arimah 2004); (iv) better management of ethnic 
conflicts (Easterly 2001); (v) less income inequality (Chong and Gradstein 2004); (vi) better 
financial development (Beck et al. 2001); (vii) more efficient allocation of aid (Epstein and 
Gang 2009), and (viii) greater sustainability of “common resource pools” through human 
cooperation (Ostrom 2005), among others.  
Figure 1: Determinants of Income 
 
Note: A variable is endogenous in a model if it is at least partly a function of other parameters and variables in the 
model. A variable is exogenous to a model if it is not determined by other parameters and variables in the model, but 
is set externally and any changes to it come from external forces. An arrow indicates a causal direction.  









Sources: Adapted from Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) and Busse et al. (2007) 
2.1  Governance, Growth, and Income: Direct Links  
Figure 1 traces how institutions and governance can be an important determinant of 
economic growth and income levels. Governance can have a direct influence on growth and 
income; for example, it can help reduce transactions costs (Aron 2000; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002), which are far higher if economic actors and agents cannot 
fully trust property rights or the rule of law. As a consequence, economic agents typically 
operate on a smaller scale, using inexpensive but less efficient technologies which render 
them less competitive. They may even retreat to the black market economy and rely on 
bribery and corruption to facilitate their operations (Busse et al. 2007). Ultimately, this leads 
to the rise of a rent-seeking, informal economy.  
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Overall, as explained by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), institutional quality can 
directly affect income levels through three channels: (i) reduced information asymmetries, as 
institutions channel information about market conditions, goods, and participants; (ii) 
reduced risk, as institutions define and enforce property rights; and (iii) greater restrictions 
on the actions of politicians and interest groups, as institutions make them (more) 
accountable to citizens (World Trade Organization [WTO] 2004). Conversely, income levels 
can also have an impact on institutions and governance: more developed countries are likely 
to have a stronger preference for high quality institutions and good governance. They would 
also have the requisite knowledge and resources to promote the latter. 
2.2  Governance, Growth, and Income: Indirect Links  
Governance can also affect growth and income indirectly, through its impact on other 
determining factors such as trade, investments, infrastructure, and geography.  
Trade has a positive effect on income levels (Figure 1). The extent to which a country is 
integrated with the rest of the world is endogenous: that is, trade influences economic growth 
rates, and vice versa. For example, trade might not only boost growth in the medium and 
long run terms, it might also be the outcome of increased productivity; this, in turn, improves 
the country’s competitiveness. 
By exploiting comparative advantage and economies of scale in production, and taking 
advantage of technology spillovers and knowledge information, institutions and governance 
can boost trade and, thus, economic growth and income levels. High quality institutions also 
help reduce the risk premium required for international trade.  
Institutional quality can be proxied by governance (Busse et al. 2007). Bolaky and Freund 
(2004) demonstrated that regulatory quality influences the interaction between trade and 
economic growth, and that countries with excessive regulations do not benefit from trade. 
Excessive regulations may encourage a country to produce goods for which it has no 
comparative advantage, or for which the terms of trade have been unfavorable over recent 
decades (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2002).
1 
Lowering trade barriers will allow nations to benefit from exchange and specialization. 
However, these trade benefits would be suboptimal or unattainable in the absence of 
adequate infrastructure and proper institutions that practice good governance (Kohsaka 
2007). Smaller economies in Asia are less likely to achieve welfare gains from trade 
liberalization in the presence of perennial economic asymmetries, where increased market 
access may produce little positive results in the short- to medium-term. The quality of 
institutions has been identified as a major factor for the disappointing export performance 
and economic underdevelopment of smaller and vulnerable economies.
2 As such, more 
recent free trade agreements (FTAs) tend to go beyond the standard features of an FTA by 
enhancing the political dimension, explicitly addressing corruption, promoting participatory 
approaches, and refocusing development policies on poverty reduction.
3  
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) argued that weak institutions act as significant barriers to 
trade. Increasing the transparency of the trading environment through greater predictability 
and simplification can be an important way of reducing trade costs (Helble, Shepherd, and 
                                                  
 
1 Trade is only beneficial if the involved adjustment costs are relatively low; that is, the reallocation of labor and 
capital from the import-competing sector to the export sector can be achieved at minimal costs. However, if the 
structure of the economy is relatively rigid, production factors cannot move to the sectors where large welfare 
gains can be achieved. This may result in a situation where trade does not have a beneficial impact on the 
allocation of resources within and between sectors. 
2 See, for example, World Bank (2001), Jutting (2003), and Levine (2005), among others.  
3 Refer, for example, to the Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP) and the European Union (EU).  
3 
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Wilson 2009). De Groot et al. (2004) found that both institutional quality and existence of 
similar institutions in trading partners are positively associated with bilateral trade.  
Trade might also influence the quality of institutions and governance through two main 
channels (Busse et al. 2007): (i) economic agents in open economies may learn from the 
experiences of their trading partners, and adapt successful institutions and regulations; and 
(ii) international competition may force countries to improve their institutional and regulatory 
setting, as a lack of reforms would otherwise force domestic producers out of business.  
In addition to facilitating trade, better regional institutions improve the regional investment 
climate and increase FDI inflows into each member country (Busse et al. 2007). Rent 
seeking and corruption might be harder in more open economies, as foreign firms increase 
the number of economic agents involved (Rajan and Zingales 2003).  
One highly relevant variable that directly affects income, trade, institutions, and governance 
is geography. Not many indicators are as exogenous as a country’s geographical location 
(Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). Geography can have a direct impact on income 
through climate, natural resource endowments, and agricultural productivity. At the same 
time, an abundance of resources can have an impact on institutional quality in developing 
countries, since this enriches (and may even corrupt) the ruling class (Bulte and Damania 
2005). 
Geography can also have an indirect impact on income through its influence on trade, where 
the distance from major markets and the degree of integration play a vital role. Strong 
institutional coordination, coupled with improved infrastructure, helps minimize international 
trade costs (Francois and Manchin 2007). 
Quite clearly, good governance and growth are positively correlated, and the quality of 
institutions and policies affect long-run economic growth. It is the interaction between 
institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of an economy (or a 
region). 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1  Measuring Governance  
In this paper, I use a comprehensive set of disaggregated indicators to measure 
governance. I identify those components of governance and institutions that matter most for 
the successful development of regional infrastructure. I construct a composite governance 
index (GI) based on the six governance indicators taken from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) database
4 of the World Bank Institute (WBI). Following the definition 
provided in the WGI (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008: 7): 
Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them. 
                                                  
 
4 This database has been compiled by Daniel Kaufmann and Massimo Mastruzzi of the World Bank Institute and 
Aart Kraay of the Development Research Group, the World Bank.  
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The GI is averaged using the following governance indicators: (i) voice and accountability; 
(ii) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) 
regulatory quality; (v) rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption. The GI represents the 
economic and political governance environment in 174 countries for the period 1996 to 2007. 
Appendix 1 provides a definition of the GI components, and explains the WBI’s methodology 
for deriving them.  
3.2  Measuring Regional Infrastructure  
Following the definition adopted in ADB/ADBI’s “Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia” study 
(ADB/ADBI, 2009), regional infrastructure in this paper is defined as: (i) infrastructure 
facilities that involve physical infrastructure, and/or coordinated policies and procedures 
spanning two or more neighboring countries; (ii) national infrastructure projects that have a 
significant cross-border impact, in that their planning and implementation involve cooperation 
or coordination with one or more neighboring governments; and (iii) infrastructure facilities 
that aim to stimulate significant amounts of regional trade, or are designed to connect to the 
network of a neighboring or third country. 
In this paper, regional infrastructure is represented by the Physical Infrastructure Index (PII), 
a composite index based on six physical infrastructure indicators representing regional and 
international infrastructure stocks of (i) roadways; (ii) railways; (iii) telecommunications; (iv) 
ports; (v) airports; and (vi) electricity. The PII covers the period 1991 to 2006, for 124 
countries where regional, national, and subnational authorities have a direct role either in the 
provision or regulation of these infrastructure facilities.
5 These indicators individually and/or 
jointly represent a region’s physical infrastructure stock.  
Infrastructure quality and stock represent the relative income-generating capacity of each 
individual country. By including the infrastructure facilities enumerated in (i) to (v) in the PII, 
regional infrastructure components are also relatively well captured. The PII was obtained 
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
6 Appendix 2 presents the weights derived from 
PCA and the indexing methodology. To check the relative robustness of PII, I also used the 
infrastructure index of the World Economic Forum (WEF), constructed using a perception 
survey (qualitative data) on 131 countries for the period 2001 to 2008 (WEF 2009).  
Finally, I measured the empirical relationship between governance and infrastructure using 
both cross-section and pooled data. Allowing for the complex relationship between regional 
infrastructure and governance in institutions, I used both the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions to account for endogeneity of 
the variables. The model and its specifications are discussed in Section 7.   
Governance indicators were derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
database, published by the World Bank Institute (WBI 2008). For the infrastructure 
indicators, I used multiple sources such as various issues of the World Competitiveness 
Report (WCR), published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), and various issues of World 
Development Indicators (WDI), published by the World Bank (World Bank 2008). The 
infrastructure indicators have been supplemented by the author’s own cross-country 
infrastructure database.
7  
                                                  
 
5   All the infrastructure facilities across countries have been normalized in terms of either population or 
geographical area for each different time point. This makes them amenable to comparison, irrespective of state 
size and population.  
6 The infrastructure indicators have been rendered unit- and scale-free before running PCA.  
7 This has been drawn from the author’s own Asia Infrastructure Database (AID), a part of which has been used 
in Kumar and De (2008) and the Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA 2007).  
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4.  GOVERNANCE IN INFRASTRUCTURE:  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
“Governance” has risen from obscurity to buzzword in just three decades (Dixit 2009).
8 
Governance has several dimensions, such as economic governance, corporate governance, 
international governance, regional governance, national governance and local governance 
(Dixit 2009). An appropriate institutional and policy framework is needed for effective 
governance (WBI 2008; UNESCAP 2006; ADB 2008).  
As noted by Dixit (2009), good economic governance is needed to secure three essential 
prerequisites: (i) collective action; (ii) enforcement of contracts; and (iii) security of property 
rights. It assures that corruption is minimized, that the views of minorities are taken into 
account, and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. 
Good economic governance is also responsive to the present and future needs of society 
(UN 2009).  
Good governance is one of the three pillars of ADB poverty reduction strategy. Assisting 
developing countries in improving governance is a strategic priority of ADB in its work to 
eliminate poverty in Asia and the Pacific (ADB 2009).
9 ADB recognizes a diversity of political 
systems and institutional cultures in the region. Nonetheless, it defines four aspects of sound 
governance which are relevant for all countries
10: 
(i)  Accountability: Officials are answerable to the entity from which they derive their 
authority; work is conducted according to agreed rules and standards, and 
reported fairly and accurately. 
(ii)  Participation: Public employees are given a role in decision making; citizens, and 
especially the poor, are empowered by promoting their rights to access and 
secure control over basic entitlements that allow them to earn a living. 
(iii)  Predictability: Laws, regulations, and policies are applied with fairness and 
consistency.  
(iv)  Transparency: Low cost, understandable, and relevant information are made 
available to citizens to promote effective accountability, and clarity about laws, 
regulations, and policies.  
In general, good governance has eight major characteristics: it is participatory, consensus 
oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive, and mindful of the rule of law.  
A region’s infrastructure network, broadly speaking, is the very socio-economic climate 
created by the institutions that serve as conduits of trade and investment. Some of these 
institutions are public, others private. In either case, their roles in the context of integration 
are transformative, helping to change resources into outputs or to enhance trade by 
removing barriers. Therefore, an improvement in regional infrastructure is one of the key 
factors affecting the long-term growth of a region.  
                                                  
 
8 According to EconLit, “world governance” was mentioned 5 times in the 1970s; by the end of 2008, reference to 
“governance” had increased to 33,177, with ‘economic governance’ appearing 192 times, and ‘corporate 
governance’ appearing 9,717 times (Dixit 2009). 
9 ADB, for example, has been implementing the Governance and Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP), funded by 
the Governance Cooperation Fund (GCF), for the improvement of governance in selected member countries 
(ADB 2009). 
10  ADB’s approach to governance, established as a Core Strategic Area of Intervention under its Long-term 
Strategic Framework (2001–2015), recognizes the importance of capacity development and identifies these 
four key interrelated elements that are considered necessary to sustain efforts and ensure results. Refer, for 
example, to ADB (1995, 2006a, 2009), and Wescott (2005).  
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The linkages between infrastructure and economic growth are multiple and complex. Not 
only does infrastructure affect production and consumption directly, it also creates many 
direct and indirect externalities. It also involves large flows of expenditure, thereby creating 
additional employment. Studies have shown that infrastructure can have a significant impact 
on output, income, employment, international trade, and quality of life.
11  
Infrastructure has always played a key role in integrating economies within a region. Well-
developed and efficient infrastructure is essential for a region’s economic development and 
growth. In a dynamic concept, infrastructure is seen as a regional public good that moves 
factors of production within and across countries, thus helping the region attain higher 
productivity and growth (Figure 1).  
In a regional setting, infrastructure is a combination of two components: national and 
international (regional) infrastructure. Regional infrastructure is seen as one of the major 
determinants of the economic integration process (Vickerman 2002; Kuroda, Kawai, and 
Nangia 2007; Venables 2007; Francois, Manching and Balaoing 2009). Regional 
infrastructure is non-rival in consumption, functions as a regional public good, and enhances 
regional connectivity. It is often argued that if countries in a region are not linked through 
efficient infrastructure facilities, then the regional integration process would undoubtedly slow 
down.
12  
Investments toward improving sector policies, governance, and the institutional environment 
need to be better targeted. As Kuroda, Kawai, and Nangia (2007: 253) have commented: 
“The strong need for planning and coordination for cross-border infrastructure requires a 
systematic institutional arrangement, whether formal or informal. Though in theory, ad hoc 
institutional and technocratic coordination and negotiations between governments on a 
project-to-project basis should work well without a formalized institutional or legal framework, 
in reality this approach has had high failure rates and long lead times, significantly raising 
transaction costs and making such collaborations infeasible. Strong institutional coordination 
helps minimize such costs. A systematic, comprehensive, institutionalized approach is 
essential for success.”  
Improved governance and policies have promoted prosperity and stability in participating 
countries. A study by the ADB-WB-JBIC (2005), for instance, found that the lack of 
infrastructure sector reform and minimal privatization of existing assets gave little room for 
competition or independent regulation. According to ADB (2006b), the varying strengths and 
weaknesses of regulatory regimes between countries make regional infrastructure projects 
difficult to coordinate and develop, particularly with regard to securing private sector 
financing, which requires strong regulation to mitigate risks.  
In many cases, poor governance operates no differently from a tax: it deters economic 
activity just as a tax would (Dixit 2009). In order for the benefits of long-term infrastructure 
investments to trickle down in Asia, the governance of infrastructure is crucial. The ADB, in 
its Regional Cooperation and Integration Strategy on cross-border infrastructure, tackled a 
range of issues including public and private roles in provision, regulation, and 
management.
13 It highlighted the vital importance of governance, while suggesting several 
approaches to promoting regional integration.  
There have been considerable changes in the delivery of national and international 
infrastructure services worldwide. However, performance in terms of infrastructure service 
delivery and quality continue to vary across sectors, regions, and countries. Jones (2006), 
                                                  
 
11 Refer, for example, to Munnell (1990); Fedderke, Perkins, and Luiz (2006); Aschauer (1989); World Bank 
(1994); Ghosh and De (2005); Kohsaka (2007); and Batten and Karlsson (1996).  
12 A vast literature exists on the impact of infrastructure on regional integration. Refer, for example, to Brooks and 
Menon (2008).  
13 See, for example, ADB (2006c) 
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for example, has noted that in some Asian countries, infrastructure investment has not had 
the anticipated long-term impact on the quality and extent of utility and transport services. 
Privatization and competition have had some success in some countries (World Bank 2005); 
across sectors, there is also evidence to suggest that private provision can improve the 
quality of services and the extent of provision (Levy 2007). At the same time, however, it 
appears that many of the institutional weaknesses underlying poor provision and low 
sustainability are not solved by allowing private investment, and in some sectors private 
provision is likely to have a comparatively minor role (Kenny 2007).  
Successful regional infrastructure development requires appropriate institutional 
arrangements. Institutional and software components in regional infrastructure are just as 
important as the hardware components (Kuroda, Kawai, and Nangia 2007). For any hard 
infrastructure facility to work, well-designed institutional and software support is essential. 
Jansen and Nordas (2006) argued that trade policies at home and abroad matter most for 
home imports, together with foreign institutions and home infrastructure.  
The importance of institutions to infrastructure performance is also evident from an analysis 
of the costs of corruption in the infrastructure sector.
14 While corruption is a symptom of 
failed governance, it can also further weaken the governance environment. Corruption not 
only raises the price of infrastructure, it can also reduce the quality of, and economic returns 
to, infrastructure investment. Corruption can lower the quality of public infrastructure (Bose, 
Capasso, and Murshid 2008); some studies (Tanzi and Davodi 1998; Gulati and Rao 2006; 
Kenny 2009) also indicate that corruption (petty and grand) in infrastructure development 
negatively impacts a country’s growth. Thus, transparency has been viewed as a key factor 
in reducing corruption (Kolstad and Wiig 2009).  
In Asia, the public sector is involved in regulating and supplying the bulk of national and 
regional infrastructure. Therefore, there is a strong need for regional public policy. Good 
governance at the regional level has a direct and positive effect on the local governance of 
each country in the region (Shepotylo 2006). I call this governance diffusion.  
Without adequate regulation and institutions, regional infrastructure provision will be 
suboptimal (OECD 2009). Therefore, good institutional governance is essential for achieving 
a seamless Asia.  
Since governance is multidimensional, an analysis of governance will have to include more 
factors than income. The question of how governance should be measured has recently 
received growing attention. While studies have focused on the links between national 
infrastructure and governance and institutions, thus far, no empirical study has focused on 
the links between governance and regional infrastructure. Do improved governance and 
institutions promote regional infrastructure? The rest of this paper is devoted to answering 
this question.  
5.  MEASURING GOVERNANCE IN INSTITUTIONS:  
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS  
There are two dimensions to measuring any governance system (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2007): regulatory governance and regulatory substance.  
                                                  
 
14 Refer, for example, to the seminal works of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006), and Rose-Ackerman 
(1975) on the economics of corruption.  
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•  Regulatory governance is measured using rules-based or de jure indicators. These 
indicators look at whether the requisite legislations or regulatory entities for 
facilitating investments in infrastructure are in place (the how of governance/rules 
in the book). 
•  Regulatory substance is measured using outcome-based or de facto indicators. 
These indicators look at whether de jure rules are enforced in practice as intended 
by law (the what of governance/rules on the ground).  
As noted by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008), a rules-based indicator of corruption 
might measure the extent to which countries have legislation prohibiting corruption, or simply 
reflect whether an anticorruption agency exists. An outcome-based measure, on the other 
hand, could assess whether the laws are enforced, or whether the anticorruption agency is 
undermined by political influence.  
Following Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007), I considered both de jure and de facto 
indicators of governance. The governance index (GI) for each country was constructed by 
taking the mean of six governance indicators: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) 
rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption.
15  
Although good governance measures are perception-based indicators, I have used them in 
this study since they are the only comparable figures available for a very large number of 
countries, including most of the Asian countries. No other source of information on 
governance and institutional quality covers the Asian region in such a comprehensive 
manner.  
I calculated the GI for 174 countries for the period 1996 to 2007. Tables 1a and 1b present a 
global ranking of the ten best and worst performing countries based on the GI. Table 2 
presents the same for the East Asia Summit (EAS) countries
16. A correlation matrix for good 
governance indicators is presented in Table 3.  



















GI , where X
t
ij represents governance indicators of country i for the year t. All indicators 
are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and range from -2.5 to +2.5.  
16  EAS represents ASEAN+6: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
People’s Republic of China, and Republic of Korea. 
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Table 1a: Global Ranks of Top 10 Countries in GI 
Country 2007  1996
Switzerland 1  4 
Iceland 2  21 
Finland 3  8 
Luxembourg   4  11 
Sweden 5  7 
New Zealand  6  3 
Denmark 7  10 
Norway 8  5 
Austria 9  9 
Ireland 10  17 
Note: Spearman rank correlation (174) (2007&1996) = 0.923 
 
Table 1b: Global Ranks of Bottom 10 Countries in GI 
Country 2007  1996 
Cote D’Ivoire   165  92 
Chad 166  147 
Guinea 167  135 
Sudan 168  168 
Zimbabwe 169  122 
Afghanistan 170  167 
Congo, D.R  171  169 
Myanmar 172  163 
Iraq 173  172 
Somalia 174  174 
Note: Spearman rank correlation (174) (2007&1996) = 0.904 
 
Table 2: Global Rank of EAS Countries in GI 
Country 2007  1996 
Australia 13  13 
Brunei Darussalam  54  41 
Cambodia 141  (↑) 149 
China, People’s Rep.  109  97 
Hong Kong, China  20 (↑) 32 
India 81  (↑) 94 
Indonesia 118  112 
Japan 24  (↑) 26 
Korea, Republic of  41 (↑) 49 
Lao PDR  148  126 
Malaysia 61  47 
Myanmar 172  163 
New Zealand  6  3 
Philippines   110  69 
Singapore 22  20 
Thailand 90  57 
Viet Nam  114 (↑) 118 
Note: Spearman rank correlation (17) (2007&1996) = 0.957. Upward arrow means improvement in ranks in 2007, 
compared to 1996.  
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0.661*  0.769* 0.777*  0.819*  0.792*  0.646*  1 
Note: *Significant at 5% level. #Taken in log scale. **Sample (country) = 174 
A number of results are worth highlighting. First, with the exception of New Zealand, the best 
performers in the GI in 2007 were from Europe; in contrast, most of the bottom 10 countries 
were from Africa. At the same time, the correlations suggest that there has been very little 
change in the ranking of countries in the top and bottom 10 positions. This suggests a high 
degree of stickiness in the relative rankings of the countries in terms of the GI.  
Second, smaller countries seem to have made bigger strides in improving governance than 
bigger countries; Iceland’s performance has been most impressive, with its global rank 
improving from 21 in 1996 to 2 in 2007.
17 In contrast, Somalia has consistently ranked last in 
the global league table.
18  
Third, the performance of EAS countries in the GI has been mixed. While some countries 
such as Japan, Republic of Korea, India, Hong Kong, China, Viet Nam and Cambodia have 
improved their global ranking, many EAS countries have actually experienced a deterioration 
in their rankings between 1996 and 2007. Wide variations likewise exist: while New Zealand 
garnered a spot in the top 10, Myanmar appeared in the bottom 10 countries in 2007. In 
relative terms, governance in Asian countries such as the Philippines, Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Viet Nam, and Indonesia has remained 
unsatisfactory.  
                                                  
 
17 Although Iceland was badly ravaged by the ongoing global economic crisis, it still managed to rank second in 
best governance.  
18 For some time, Somalia was in the limelight due to incidences of sea piracy. 
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Figure 2: Scatter Plot of Per Capita Income vs. Governance 
 
Note: PCI represents per capita income in constant US$.  
Data source: World Bank (2008).  
Fourth, given that the GI components are perception-based indicators, it is not surprising 
that all six indicators are closely associated with the log of GDP per capita. The partial 
correlations fall within the range of 0.66 to 0.89, indicating a very close linkage with per 
capita income (Table 3). Most of the indicators are likewise closely related to one another, 
with partial correlations consistently at or above 0.65. Per capita income and aggregate 
governance are also highly correlated (Figure 2). The scatter diagrams drawn separately for 
1996 and 2007 in Figure 2 do not only indicate a positive association between governance 
and per capita income, but also reveal a relative change in levels between 1996 and 2007.
19  
Quite clearly, the ordinal measures adopted in this paper evince the lack of significant 
change in the relative rankings of countries in terms of governance between 1996 and 2007. 
Meanwhile, the correlations suggest that countries with better governance also tend to have 
higher per capita income.
20  
                                                  
 
19 I used Lowess plots to explore the relationship between per capita income and governance. These locally-
weighted regressions use a function that attaches less weight to points far from the mean. Figures 2   in this 
paper show the Lowess plot for the default options in Stata 10, which include a bandwidth of 0.8 (this means 
that in each regression, 80% of the observations are included) and a Tricube Weighting scheme (this means 
that the observations farther away from the mean get a lower weight). Results are robust to changes in the 
weighing scheme, including a change to a rectangular weighting scheme (in which all observations get equal 
weights) and a change in the band width. This pattern is also robust to changes in year. 
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Do countries with higher per capita income and better governance also have higher levels of 
regional infrastructure? To answer this question, I look at the relationship between 
infrastructure and governance, using the same set of countries.  
6.  REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: 
ASIA IN THE WORLD 
Investing in infrastructure facilities such as roads, railways, seaports, airports, electricity, and 
telecommunication requires a long period of time and an enormous amount of intra-
generational resource transfers. The presence of such infrastructure facilities has a direct 
impact on production, and benefit a region by “crowding in” private investment (both 
domestic and foreign).The absence of such facilities in a region may result in lower 
“productive efficiency”; previous studies have shown that a decline in region’s productivity is 
often preceded by a fall in infrastructure investment.
21  
In this study, I have constructed the physical infrastructure index (PII), a composite index 
comprised of six physical infrastructure indicators: (i) roadways; (ii) railways; (iii) airports; (iv) 
seaports; (v) telecommunications; and (vi) electricity. The index was calculated for 124 
countries for the period 1995 to 2006. Appendix 3 provides a definition of these variables 
and their corresponding sources. Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the PII is 
constructed as a linear combination of the unit- and scale-free values of the individual 
facilities.
22  
Table 4 presents a global ranking of the best and worst performing countries in terms of the 
PII for the year 2006. To check the relative robustness of the PII, Table 5 presents a similar 
ranking of countries using the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) infrastructure index.  
A number of results are worth noting. First, developed countries occupy the top 10 positions 
in the PII ranking, whereas the bottom 10 positions are occupied by least developed 
countries in Africa, with the exception of Cambodia. Except for a few cases, these results are 
largely consistent with the WEF rankings presented in Table 5.  
Second, while some of the Asian countries saw improvements in their global rankings 
between 1996 and 2006 (Table 6), on the whole, the stock of infrastructure in East Asian 
countries remains remarkable low, with the exception of Japan and Singapore. The 
disparities in regional infrastructure stock, both among East Asian countries as well as in 
relation to developed economies, are not only alarmingly high but also growing. While the 
PRC has made huge strides in improving its infrastructure, the poor performance of 
countries like Indonesia remains a matter of serious concern.  
Third, there is clearly prima facie evidence of a positive association between infrastructure 
and per capita income (Figure 3). This implies that although the ranking of countries has not 
changed much between 1996 and 2006 (given the high correlation of 0.972), countries with 
a higher stock of infrastructure have also enjoyed higher income over time. 
                                                  
 
kij kj ij X W PII ∑ =
21 Refer, for example, to Munnell (1990). 
22 Specifically,  , where PIIij  is infrastructure index of the i-th country in j-th time, Wkj is weight 
of the k-th facility in j-th time, and Xkij  is the unit- and scale-  free value of the k-th facility for the i-th country in 
j-th time point. This helps us to derive the index (score) after adding the multiplied values corresponding to 
each category. As discussed, the weights (Wkj) in this equation were derived using PCA. 
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Table 4a: Global Ranking of Countries in Regional Infrastructure  









United States  8 
Ireland 9 
Norway 10 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Table 4b: Global Ranking of Countries in Regional Infrastructure  








Congo, Rep. of  123 
Central African Republic  124 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  125 
Chad 126 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Per Capita Income vs. Infrastructure (PII) 
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Table 5a: WEF Global Ranking of Countries in Regional Infrastructure;  






Hong Kong, China   5 





Source: World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm).  
 
Table 5b: WEF Global Ranking of Countries in Regional Infrastructure;  












Source: World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm).  
 
Table 6: Ranking of EAS Countries in Infrastructure based on the PII 
Country 2006  1996 
Australia 14  8 
Brunei 33  22 
Cambodia 116  103 
China, People’s Rep.  36 (↑) 49 
India 53  (↑) 58 
Indonesia 69  66 
Japan 2  (↑) 5 
Korea, Republic of  18 (↑) 26 
Lao PDR  92 (↑) 97 
Malaysia 29  (↑) 37 
Myanmar 111  93 
New Zealand  15  13 
Philippines 74  (↑) 76 
Singapore 3  (↑) 6 
Thailand 48  43 
Viet Nam  71 (↑) 79 
Note: Spearman rank correlation (16) (2006&1996) = 0.972. Upward arrow means improvement in ranks in 2006, 
compared to 1996. 
Source: Author’s own calculation.  
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix for Infrastructure, Governance, and Income (2006) 
Item  GI  RL RQ GE PS VA CC  PCI
# PII 
G I  1            
RL  0.968*  1          
RQ  0.941*  0.891*  1         
GE  0.962*  0.940*  0.948*  1        
PS  0.819* 0.772* 0.671* 0.699*  1         
VA  0.858* 0.766* 0.792* 0.764* 0.649*  1       
CC  0.954* 0.952* 0.880* 0.937* 0.716* 0.758*  1     
PCI
#  0.803* 0.806* 0.767* 0.821* 0.563* 0.601* 0.845*  1   
PII  0.878* 0.894* 0.856* 0.903* 0.633* 0.703* 0.885* 0.920*  1 
Note: GI = Governance Index; RL = Rule of Law; RQ = Regulatory Quality; GE = Government Effectiveness; PS = 
Political Stability; VA = Voice and Accountability; CC = Control of Corruption; PCI = Per Capita Income; PII = Physical 
Infrastructure Index. *Significant at 5% level. **Sample (country) = 158. #Taken in log scale 
Source: Author’s own calculation.  
Having seen the relative positions of the countries in the infrastructure-income plane, I now 
test the nature of the relationship between regional infrastructure and governance. Does 
improved governance help countries attain higher levels of infrastructure? The scatter 
diagrams in Figures 4 to 10 reveal the following correlations.  
First, infrastructure is highly correlated with governance (Table 7). Most of the governance 
indicators have partial correlation coefficients in the high range of 0.6 to 0.9, indicating that 
(i) the linkage between infrastructure and governance is based on a broader range of 
indicators; and (ii) this linkage does not vary considerably among the indicators.  
Second, when represented by aggregate indices, governance and infrastructure continue to 
show a positive correlation, suggesting that good governance underpins infrastructure 
development (Figure 3). In general, rule of law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, control of corruption, and political stability do facilitate the 
development of both regional and national infrastructure.  
Third, infrastructure also shows a positive association with most of the GI indicators: rule of 
law (Figure 5), regulatory quality (Figure 6), government effectiveness (Figure 7), political 
stability (Figure 8), and voice and accountability (Figure 9). These can therefore be viewed 
as the basic ingredients of governance that a country should possess. Simply put, countries 
which lack good governance are likely to fail in improving infrastructure, regional or 
otherwise.  
Fourth, contrary to popular belief, corruption (as represented by unofficial payments) does 
not have a positive association with infrastructure (Figure 10).
23 Both petty and grand forms 
of corruption do not facilitate the development of infrastructure. However, the congestion at 
origin in both Figures 10a and 10b indicates that one cannot immediately discount the “thin” 
positive association between corruption and infrastructure development, perhaps at the initial 
stages of development, ceteris paribus.  
Fifth, poor governance clearly raises uncertainty, leading private investors (both domestic 
and foreign) to increase the risk premium for investments in infrastructure; this, in turn, 
reduces overall investment and diminishes the prospects for economic development. 
To sum up, the linkages between regional infrastructure and governance are multiple and 
complex. Governance reforms are therefore one of the important factors affecting 
                                                  
 
23 Unofficial payments to public officials are the percentage of firms expected to make informal payments to 
public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and the like. 
Data is available from the World Bank, Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org). Replacing the 
PII with the infrastructure index of WEF does not change the result, and instead makes the association more 
robust.   
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infrastructure development. Without adequate governance, the provision of regional 
infrastructure will be suboptimal and unsustainable. But can governance alone determine 
regional infrastructure development? I attempt to answer this question next.  
Figure 4: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure vs. Governance 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
Figure 5: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure vs. Rule of Law 
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Figure 6: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure vs. Regulatory Quality 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
 
Figure 7: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure vs. Government Effectiveness 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
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Source: Author’s own calculation.  
 
Figure 9: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure vs. Voice and Accountability 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
 
Figure 10a: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure (PII) and Unofficial Payments 
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Figure 10b: Scatter Plot of Infrastructure (WEF) and Unofficial Payments 
 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
7.  DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
In the previous section, I demonstrated that governance and institutions are positively 
correlated with infrastructure development. However, thus far I have not examined the 
functional relationship between governance and infrastructure, while controlling for 
exogenous factors. I therefore try to verify whether governance influences regional 
infrastructure development in interactions with other exogenous variables.  
The bivariate associations discussed in the previous sections indicate that governance 
(institution quality) has a positive and significant effect on income and infrastructure. As 
Figure 1 indicates, trade (integration) can also have a positive impact on governance, 
infrastructure, and  output, suggesting that trade (integration) can have an indirect effect on 
incomes by improving institutional and infrastructure qualities. Figure 11 better captures this 
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Figure 11: Factors Potentially Affecting Regional Infrastructure Development 
 











GDP / Growth 
Regulatory 
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In order to find the probable determinants of regional infrastructure, I defined regional 
infrastructure as a product of (i) the scale and structure of country’s economic size; (ii) 
domestic and international demand, through production and international trade; and (iii) 
governance in institutions, among others. I then estimated the following baseline equation:  
i it
'
it it i it gion Re X Gov Infra ε β β β α α + + + + + = 3 2 1 0         (1) 
where i represents a country, t time and εi is the error term. The dependent variable Infra, is 
the PII representing regional infrastructure. Gov is a composite measure of governance 
(represented by the governance index), X is a vector of additional regressors, and Region is 
a dummy variable representing geographical regions with regional infrastructure: (i) Asia (=1 
for Asian countries, 0 otherwise); (ii) Europe (=1 for European countries, 0 otherwise); and 
(iii) Latin America (= 1 for Latin American countries, 0 otherwise).
24 Additional regressors (X) 
include some control variables to represent internal and external demand for infrastructure, 
such as per capita income, population, industry and trade. All regressions include country 
fixed effects (αi).  
I introduced an interactive term between Gov and Region to examine the impact of regional 
governance on regional infrastructure development. Equation (1) then becomes: 
i it it it
'
it it i it ) gion Re * Gov ( gion Re X Gov Infra ε β β β β α α + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0    (2) 
The base year for all the variables is 2006, except otherwise mentioned. I included all 
countries for which data is available for the dependent and independent variables. That left 
                                                  
 
24 In my analysis, I consider the Asia-Pacific members of Asian Development Bank (ADB) as Asia, European 
members of the EU as Europe, and Latin American members of Inter-American Development Bank as Latin 
America.   
22 
 ADBI Working Paper 183    De 
 
us with a sample of 98 countries, a relatively large dataset for this type of exercise. 
Moreover, I included all 16 EAS countries and 35 Asia-Pacific members of ADB, to represent 
the region Asia in this analysis.  
Since there are significant and systematic variations in infrastructure development across 
countries, a satisfactory model should explain substantial heterogeneity at the country level. 
Using cross-section pooled data can better explain the relevant relationships between 
regional infrastructure and governance over time when I have both time-variant and time-
invariant regressors; because of its structural nature, it will take a long time before the 
potential impact of infrastructure development on the economy is realized. The use of cross-
section pooled data also has the advantage of better capturing the dynamic relationship 
between endogenous and exogenous variables, by introducing more variability, less 
collinearity, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency. I therefore tested the baseline 
equation (2) using both cross-section (2006) and cross-section and pooled (1996 and 2006) 
frameworks.  
Given the bivariate associations discussed in the previous section, I have yet to ascertain 
the functional relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables. To do this, I used 
both the linear (OLS) and non-linear (ordered probit) models. To check the relative 
robustness of the model, I replaced the PII with the infrastructure index of the WEF, for the 
cross-section analysis. I selected Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in Model 2 for two 
technical reasons: (i) the Hausman test (1978) rejected fixed effect (OLS) and select random 
effect (GLS), and (ii) GLS provided a higher R-squared, compared to OLS. Estimation 
results are presented in Tables 8 and 9.  
23 
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Table 8: Baseline Regression Results I: Cross-section, 2006 
  OLS(PII) OLS(WEF)  OP  (PII) 
Governance 
2.010*** 0.633***  0.355 
(4.48) (4.182) [0.859] 
Ln Per capita income 
1.732*** 0.428***  1.034*** 
(8.18) (6.602) [5.011] 
Ln Population 
0.513*** 0.184***  0.143 
(3.679) (4.466)  (1.141) 
Trade openness 
0.00455 0.00273*** -0.00135 
(1.117) (2.795)  [-0.342] 
Manufacturing value 
added 
0.00664 0.00371  0.0165 
(0.212) (0.438)  [0.651] 
Asia (35) 
0.697 0.0742  0.307 
(1.416) (0.512)  (0.704) 
Europe (EU) (27) 
1.064 0.890***  0.513 
(1.113) (3.430)  [0.538] 
Latin America (LA) (20) 
-2.912*** -0.466***  -1.218** 
(-4.456) (-2.934)  (-2.262) 
Governance*Asia 
0.707 -0.133 -0.285 
(1.377) (-0.850)  [-0.522] 
Governance*EU 
2.022** 0.539**  0.209 
(2.441) (2.391)  (0.156) 
Governance*LA 
-1.455 -0.242 -0.0918 
(-1.570) (-1.074)  (-0.124) 
Distance from equator 
0.023*** 0.021***  0.022 
(4.651) (4.235)  [1.431] 
Adjusted R
2  0.898  0.841   
Pseudo R
2     0.555 
F (Prob>F)   78.38 (0.00)  57.44 (0.00)   
Wald chi2 (Prob > chi2)      119.52 (0.00) 
Observations 98  118  98 
Note: 1. OP (Ordered Probit): 3=Best (high), 2= Good (medium), 1 = Worst (low). 2. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in first and third brackets represent the t- and z- statistics, 
respectively.  
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 9: Baseline Regression Results II: Cross-section Pooled, 1996 and 2006 













Manufacturing value added 
0.0161 0.0576*** 
(0.56) (2.694) 
Asia (time variant) 
0.392 0.114 
(0.674) [0.397] 
Europe (EU) (time variant) 
0.0363 1.853*** 
(0.0595) (4.426) 

















2  0.812   
Pseudo R
2   0.578 
Wald chi2 (Prob > chi2)  570.69 (0.00)  129.22 (0.00) 
Selection of model    
Hausman test   0.215   
chi2 (Prob>chi2)  0.086   
Observations 192  192 
No of countries in sample  99  99 
Country effect  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes 
Note: 1. OP (Ordered Probit): 3=Best (high), 2= Good (medium), 1 = Worst (low). 2. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, while figures in parentheses represent the t-and z-statistics. 3. Selection of 
random effect (GLS) over fixed effect is based on Hausman test (1978). 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 10a: Baseline Regression Results I: Cross-section, 2006 
OLS (PII) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Ln Per capita 
income 
0.135**  0.133***  0.132***  0.140*** 0.137*** 0.131*** 
(12.170) (15.260) (11.820) (20.210) (19.610) (11.090)
Ln Population 
 
0.432*** 0.349** 0.326*** 0.202*  0.276* 0.673** 
(3.180) (2.761) (3.347) (2.132)  (1.880)  (2.524) 
Manufacturing 
value added 
0.111***  0.110*** 0.0883*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 
(4.550) (4.380) (3.540) (4.640)  (4.520)  (4.920) 
Trade openness 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003  0.028*  0.001 
(0.700) (0.620) (0.390) (1.010)  (1.910)  (0.480) 
Asia (35) 
0.403 0.304 0.310 0.399  0.512  0.504 
(1.010) (0.740) (0.790) (0.890)  (1.220)  (1.230) 
Europe (27) 
1.628*** 1.392*** 1.706*** 2.126*** 1.296** 1.735*** 
(3.490) (2.780) (3.760) (4.130)  (2.410)  (3.620) 
Latin America (20) 
-0.622 -0.950* -0.878* -0.846  -1.260**  -0.965* 
(-1.210) (-1.810) (-1.750) (-1.480)  (-2.290)  (-1.830) 
Rule of law  
1.395***         
(4.820)         
Regulatory quality 
  1.192***       
  (4.200)       
Government 
effectiveness 
    1.546***     
    (5.260)     
Political  
Stability 
    0.119     
    (0.520)     
Voice and 
accountability 
     0.860***   
     (3.520)   
Control of 
corruption 
       1.268*** 
       (4.090) 
Distance from 
equator 
0.011*** 0.093*** 0.054**  0.067** 0.045*** 0.076* 
(3.132) (3.871) (2.972) (2.652)  (3.450)  (2.002) 
Adjusted R
2   0.928 0.924 0.931 0.910  0.920  0.924 
Observations  98 98 98 98  98  98 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the t- 
statistic. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 10b: Baseline Regression Results I: Cross-section, 2006 
Ordered Probit (PII) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Ln Per capita 
income 
0.367** 0.371** 0.378* 0.328***  0.356***  0.377** 
[3.110] [3.410] [2.970] [4.070] [4.090] [3.200] 
Ln Population 
0.113 0.109 0.126 0.131  0.111  0.138 
(1.037) (1.040) (1.041) (1.087)  (1.098)  (1.035) 
Manufacturing 
value added 
0.078* 0.077* 0.067* 0.089*  0.082*  0.079* 
[2.470] [2.410] [2.110] [2.360] [2.580] [2.450] 
Trade openness 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006  0.004  0.002 
[0.450] [0.550] [0.450] [1.320] [0.800] [0.530] 
Asia (35) 
0.020 -0.065 -0.030 -0.214  0.078 0.058 
[0.040] [-0.140] [-0.070] [-0.420]  [0.170] [0.120] 
Europe (27) 
1.366* 1.160 1.322* 1.661*  0.913  1.400* 
[2.310] [1.910] [2.340] [2.590] [1.400] [2.320] 
Latin America (20) 
-0.440 -0.590 -0.554 -0.604  -0.871  -0.584 
[-1.010] [-1.440] [-1.400] [-1.400]  [-1.950]  [-1.420] 
Rule of law 
0.605         
[1.730]         
Regulatory quality 
 0.479        
  [1.520]       
Government 
effectiveness 
    0.848*     
    [2.070]     
Political stability 
    -0.382     
    [-1.640]     
Voice and 
accountability 
     0.509*   
     [2.130]   
Control of 
corruption 
       0.498 
       [1.440] 
Distance from 
equator 
0.030 0.064 0.034 0.021  0.028  0.033 
[1.228] [1.112] [1.862] [1.231] [1.654] [1.481] 
Pseudo  R2  0.595 0.590 0.607 0.591  0.598  0.587 
Observations  98 98 98 98  98  98 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the z- 
statistic.  
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 11a: Baseline Regression Results II: Cross-section Pooled. 1996 and 2006, 
OLS (PII) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Ln Per capita 
income 
0.1367*** 0.1374***  0.1426***  0.1358*** 0.1442***  0.1412*** 
(16.18) (16.55)  (22.67)  (15.68) (25.05)  (25.29) 
Ln Population 
  
0.0145 0.0142  0.0154  0.0133 0.0132  0.0121 
(0.172) (0.170)  (0.176)  (0.167) (0.167)  (0.163) 
Manufacturing 
Value added 
0.126*** 0.109***  0.122*** 0.0961***  0.127***  0.113*** 
(6.251) (5.328)  (5.812)  (4.667) (6.006)  (5.647) 
Trade 
openness 
0.00142 0.00145  0.00184  0.00102 0.00205 0.00514* 
(0.531) (0.542)  (0.658)  (0.389) (0.716)  (1.928) 
Asia (time 
variant) 
0.148 0.0962  0.155  -0.225  -0.0236  0.0543 
(0.447) (0.288)  (0.444) (-0.684)  (-0.0672)  (0.164) 
Europe (time 
variant) 
0.591 0.762* 0.893*  0.681  1.098** 0.355 
(1.337) (1.722)  (1.913)  (1.561) (2.391)  (0.772) 
Latin America 
(time variant) 
-1.531*** -1.289***  -1.588***  -1.404*** -1.342***  -1.771*** 
(-3.623) (-3.025)  (-3.495)  (-3.356) (-3.002)  (-4.120) 
Control of 
corruption 
1.089***          
(4.773)          
Rule of law  
 
 1.071***         
 (4.553)         
Regulatory 
quality 
   0.500**      
   (2.359)      
Government 
effectiveness 
     1.280***     
     (5.305)     
Political 
stability 
       0.244   
       (1.313)   
Voice and 
accountability 
        0.925*** 
        (4.993) 
Distance from 
equator 
0.034*** 0.038***  0.037***  0.031*** 0.039***  0.038*** 
(4.345) (4.453)  (4.450)  (4.165) (4.309)  (4.451) 
Adjusted R
2 0.900 0.897 0.888 0.901 0.886 0.899 
Observations 189  192  192  192  192  192 
Country effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the t- 
statistic. 
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
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Table 11b: Baseline Regression Results II: Cross-section Pooled, 1996 and 2006 
Ordered Probit (PII) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Ln Per capita 
income 
0.1292***  0.1256***  0.1273***  0.1244*** 0.1317*** 0.1287*** 
[6.103] [5.564] [6.313] [5.385] [6.975]  [6.88] 
Ln Population 
0.0241  0.0218  0.0276  0.0235 0.0241 0.0252 
[0.325] [0.338] [0.322] [0.331] [0.308] [0.311] 
Manufacturing 
Value added 
0.107***  0.0893***  0.0909***  0.0860*** 0.0977*** 0.0924*** 
[5.724] [5.071] [5.171] [4.786] [5.569] [5.295] 
Trade 
openness 
0.00312 0.000493  0.000931  0.000896  0.00244 0.00147 
[0.918] [0.149] [0.285] [0.271] [0.726] [0.449] 
Asia (time 
variant) 
-0.414  -0.285  -0.326  -0.343 -0.337 -0.249 
[-1.462]  [-1.037]  [-1.176]  [-1.233] [-1.205] [-0.899] 
Europe (time 
variant) 
1.143* 1.185* 1.074* 1.116*  1.337**  0.944 
[1.832] [1.914] [1.716] [1.795] [2.153] [1.462] 
Latin America 
(time variant) 
-0.857** -0.741** -0.871** -0.776**  -0.801**  -0.933*** 
[-2.444]  [-2.144]  [-2.467]  [-2.227] [-2.316] [-2.604] 
Control of 
corruption 
0.0893         
[0.411]         
Rule of law  
 
  0.325       
  [1.595]       
Regulatory 
quality 
   0.224      
    [1.256]     
Government 
effectiveness 
    0.462**     
    [2.082]     
Political 
stability 
       -0.19  
     [-1.275]   
Voice and 
accountability 
       0.270* 
       [1.711] 
Distance from 
equator 
0.0232  0.0261  0.0287  0.0254 0.0276 0.0292 
[0.867] [0.993] [1.109] [1.032] [1.103] [1.001] 
Pseudo R
2  0.576  0.562  0.559  0.566 0.560 0.563 
Observations  189  192  192  192 192 192 
Country effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the z- 
statistic.  
Source:  Author’s own calculation. 
The following results bear highlighting. First, the linear models with PII as dependent 
variable are a better fit; both models explain 81-90% of the variation in observations. The 
basic results of the estimation were as expected—most of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and robust, with the correct signs and magnitudes. The good fit in both 
models tell us that good governance positively influences the development of regional 
infrastructure: every one point improvement in governance leads to a two point rise in 
regional infrastructure in Model 1 (Table 8), and a 0.85 increase in Model 2 (Table 9). At the 
sample average of the index of governance -0.04, and the value of the coefficient 2.010 (in 
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Model 1, Table 8) and 0.851 (in Model 2 in Table 9) in the baseline regression, the size of 
the effect with respect to the index of governance would vary between 1 to 2 points.  
Second, the significant and positive interaction term (Governance*EU) in both  models 
suggest that, other things being equal, membership in the EU is not critical for the 
development of regional infrastructure; what is important is the introduction of good 
governance in the region. The results for Latin America are completely opposite, while the 
results for Asia fall somewhere in between. The results imply that appropriate institutions 
and policies are required for effective governance and regional infrastructure development. 
In the case of the EU, they also suggest a degree of regional diffusion—taken together, 
regional institutions and governance have a direct and positive effect on the local 
governance of each country in the region, which in turn facilitates regional infrastructure 
development. However, the negative coefficient of the Latin America dummy (highly 
significant in both models) implies that membership in regional institutions alone has not 
helped the development of regional infrastructure in Latin America. It also suggests that the 
region has yet to significantly improve regional governance.  
Third, in both models and for both periods, the results remain largely unchanged even after I 
replaced the aggregate governance index with its individual components as regressors 
(Tables 10 and 11). The one exception was political stability, which had a negative but 
statistically insignificant coefficient. Interestingly, it is government effectiveness which had 
the strongest influence on regional infrastructure: a one point improvement in government 
effectiveness may lead to a rise of 1.28 to 1.55 points in regional infrastructure, ceteris 
paribus. The most striking result is the significance of the EU dummy. The Asia dummy 
appeared with a negative sign, but was not statistically significant. These results suggest 
that government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and voice 
and accountability are all important determinants of regional infrastructure development.  
Tables 9 and 10 show that income levels are highly significant for regional infrastructure 
development. Population is likewise revealed to be significant. Trade and manufacturing did 
not come out as significant in the models, although they had the correct signs. This may be 
the result of income and population (and also their variations) neutralizing the significance of 
trade and manufacturing in the models.  The results also suggest that a country’s growth is 
just as important as governance (both at the national and regional level) for regional 
infrastructure development.  
To conclude, countries (and regions) with higher income, stronger institutions, better 
governance, and more open economies are likely to have higher levels of regional 
infrastructure. Indirectly, the estimated results of the baseline models also suggest that that 
our efforts to promote regional infrastructure must not be limited to traditional policy 
measures aimed at attracting investment in infrastructure, but must also address policy 
reform across a number of areas. Thus, institutions and governance must play an important 
complementary role in strengthening Asia’s regional infrastructure. 
Robustness checks 
The relationships described above cannot be interpreted as causal until I rule out the 
possibility of endogeneity in equation (2). To address this problem, I used a dynamic GMM 
estimator (system-GMM) to analyze changes across countries and over time. The estimator 
also effectively deals with reverse causality by using a set of instruments for the endogenous 
variables, and includes the lagged dependent variable to account for the persistence of the 
infrastructure indicator.  
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Figure 12: Estimation Strategy 
 
Source: Author’s own drawing. 
Instruments  Control 
variables 
Infrastructure 
Instruments  Governance  
One of the main advantages of the system-GMM estimator is that it does not require any 
external instruments other than the variables already included in our dataset. It uses lagged 
levels and differences between two periods as instruments for current values of the 
endogenous variable, along with external instruments. For the infrastructure index and the 
period 1996 and 2007, for example, the system-GMM method uses the following as 
instruments: (i) levels of infrastructure for the periods 1995 and 2006 and earlier; and (iii) 
differences in infrastructure, namely, differences between the periods 1995 and 1996, and 
2006 and 2007. More importantly, the estimator does not use lagged levels or differences by 
itself for the estimation, but rather employs them as instruments to explain variation in 
infrastructure development. This approach ensures that all information will be used 
efficiently, and that focus is given to the impact of regressors (such as governance) on 
infrastructure, and not vice versa. 





it t i t i i it Z X Gov Infra Infra Infra ε λ γ β β β α + + + + + + = − − 3 2 2 1 1    (3) 
where the variables are same as in the previous models, except for two additions in equation 
(3): (i) Infrait-1 and Infrait-2 , which represent the lagged dependent variable in the previous 
period, and (ii) Zit is a set of instruments for Govit and Xit. Here, Govit is the variable of 
interest. Xit denotes the set of control variables, and εit stands for the error term. Estimating 
equation (3) by OLS for the typical pooled cross-country time series analysis with “small T 
and large N” is likely to produce biased coefficients, if the independent variable is 
endogenous. As a remedy, I followed the procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) 





it t i i it Z X Gov Infra Infra ε Δ + Δ λ + Δ γ + Δ β + Δ β + α = Δ − 3 2 2       (4) 
where ΔInfrait = Infrait – Infrait-1. As a second step, I estimated equation (4) using system-
GMM.
25 The system-GMM approach estimates equations (3) and (4) simultaneously, by 
using lagged levels and lagged differences as instruments.
26 I favored the system-GMM 
                                                  
 
25 By following this approach, I obtained the Arellano and Bond difference-GMM estimator. This estimator, which 
can be viewed as an extension of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator, produces efficient (and 
consistent) estimates; the latter estimator fails to take all the potential orthogonality conditions into account. 
26 In two later papers, however, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) revealed a potential 
weakness of the difference-GMM estimator. They showed that lagged levels can be poor instruments for first-
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estimator, as Infra is very likely to be persistent. Because I used lagged levels and lagged 
differences, the number of instruments can be quite large in a system-GMM estimator. I 
used 15 instruments in the analysis. I also report the results of IV regressions (2SLS). To 
test the appropriateness of the instruments used, I used the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions in the case of 2SLS, and Hansen J statistics in case of system-GMM in Table 12. 
The Sargan and J- statistics show that the applied instruments are valid. The estimation 
results are reported in Table 12.  
The following observations are worth mentioning. First, the signs and statistical significance 
of the coefficients confirm the results obtained for regional infrastructure development in 
Tables 8 and 9. Moreover, the results obtained in the 2SLS and system-GMM are very 
similar to each other, except for the size of the coefficients. In the 2SLS, governance (and 
institutional quality) remains a strong predictor of regional infrastructure development, 
despite the fact that the magnitude of its coefficient is lower compared to the estimates 
obtained in equation (2). On the other hand, the coefficient for governance is much bigger in 
the system-GMM in equation (4). The results have therefore improved compared to those 
reported in Table 9, an indication of the general robustness of the relationship between 
regional infrastructure and governance.  
Second, I find substantial improvements in the results for the dummy variable Asia and its 
corresponding interaction term in equation (4), compared to equation (2). The interaction 
term in equation (4) yielded the best results in terms of significance and the overall 
explanatory power of the regressions. The estimated coefficients for Asia and the interaction 
term are significant at the 5% level in the 2SLS and at the 10% level in the system-GMM, 
thereby suggesting that (i) national and regional governance must move in parallel in order 
to have optimal regional infrastructure development in Asia; and (ii) regional governance is 
perhaps more important than national governance, for regional infrastructure to develop in 
Asia. A one point improvement in regional governance would lead to roughly a two point 
increase in regional infrastructure in Asia, other things being equal. With the average of the 
index of governance (-0.04), the size of the effect with respect to the index of governance 
would vary between 1 to 1.5.
27  
Third, when the governance index takes on a negative value (in the range -2.5 to +2.5), the 
interaction term (Gov*Asia) actually becomes negative. This suggests that, in the case of 
corrupt countries with inefficient governments and weak institutions or governance, regional 
infrastructure may not facilitate integration with the international market. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
differenced variables, particularly if the variables are persistent. In their modification of the estimator, they 
suggested the inclusion of lagged levels along lagged differences. In contrast to the original difference- GMM, 
they termed this the expanded estimator system-GMM. 
27 Governance refers to the scale of -2.5 to +2.5.  
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Table 12: Determinants of Infrastructure (PII) 





































2   0.8182  0.7966 
Wald chi2 (Prob > chi2)  242.37  288.95 
Test of over-identification    
Sargan chi2 (Prob > chi2)  18.6532 (0.0048)   
Hansen's J chi2 (Prob > chi2)    12.4553 (0.0031) 
Instruments  Yes (15)  Yes (15) 
Country effects  Yes  Yes 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in third brackets represent the 
z- statistic. Statistically insignificant instruments are not reported in the results.  
Source: Author’s own calculation.  
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Afghanistan -0.170  0.193  0.024 
Armenia 1.172  1.535  2.706 
Australia 3.113  3.476  6.589 
Azerbaijan 0.644  1.007  1.650 
Bangladesh 0.565  0.928  1.493 
Bhutan 1.869  2.232  4.101 
Brunei 1.910  2.273  4.183 
Cambodia 0.651  1.014  1.664 
China, People’s Rep.  0.950  1.313  2.262 
Fiji 1.268  1.631  2.899 
Hong Kong, China  2.964  3.327  6.290 
India 1.367  1.730  3.098 
Indonesia 0.889  1.252  2.142 
Japan 2.748  3.111  5.860 
Kazakhstan 0.885  1.248  2.132 
Korea, Republic of  2.146  2.509  4.656 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.566  0.929  1.494 
Lao PDR  0.571  0.934  1.506 
Malaysia 1.868  2.231  4.099 
Maldives 1.444  1.807  3.251 
Mongolia 1.408  1.771  3.179 
Myanmar -0.144  0.219  0.074 
Nepal 0.523  0.886  1.409 
New Zealand  3.281  3.644  6.924 
Pakistan 0.576  0.939  1.515 
Philippines 1.034  1.397  2.431 
Singapore 2.989  3.352  6.340 
Sri Lanka  1.122  1.485  2.607 
Tajikistan 0.392  0.755  1.148 
Thailand 1.290  1.653  2.943 
Turkmenistan 0.074  0.437  0.512 
Uzbekistan 0.051  0.414  0.466 
Viet Nam  0.948  1.311  2.260 
Note: *Counts system-GMM estimates.  
Source: Author’s own calculation.  




Total effects  4.316  4.316 
National governance in Asia  4.339  4.329 
Regional governance in Asia  4.144  4.329 
Change in 1 percentage point 
in Governance Index (GI)  5.198  5.505 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Fourth, the size of country-level governance effects on regional infrastructure varies between 
0.02 and 6.92 (Table 13).
28 Improvements in regional governance have a greater effect on 
regional infrastructure development (between 3.64 and 0.19), compared to improvements in 
national governance (between -0.17 and 3.28) in Asia. In some cases, deficiencies in 
national governance may be overcome if these are complemented by improved regional 
governance, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, the total average effect of governance, which depends on these complex 
interactions, can be estimated by calculating the marginal effects. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the results in Table 12, I computed the marginal effects for the variables of 
interest.
29 Given the underlying equation (3), these marginal effects can be interpreted as 
variations relative to the mean value at a given income level. In other words, they quantify 
the observed improvement in regional infrastructure when a country has improved 
governance, relative to other countries at the same income level. The estimated marginal 
effects further strengthen our arguments: both national and regional governance facilitates 
regional infrastructure development.  
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I have performed a comprehensive empirical analysis of the linkages between 
governance and infrastructure development. Our results indicate that governance is crucial 
for regional infrastructure development, and therefore beneficial to all Asian countries. Good 
governance helps unlock the full economic potential of a region or nation; more effective 
policy approaches toward improved governance are therefore needed to complement 
regional infrastructure development initiatives in Asia.  
The results of the analysis show that the linkages between regional infrastructure and 
governance are multiple and complex. The results also make it abundantly clear that 
governance reform is a key factor affecting regional infrastructure development: every one 
point increase in governance would lead to 1 to 1.5 rise in regional infrastructure in Asia. 
The findings of this study suggest that, other things being equal, membership in regional 
organisations is not critical for developing regional infrastructure. What matters is good 
governance (as in the case of the EU).  
Countries and regions with higher income, stronger institutions, better governance, and more 
open economies are likely to have higher levels of regional infrastructure. The estimated 
marginal effects calculated in this paper further evince that governance—both national and 
regional—facilitates regional infrastructure development.  
The results of the analysis also imply that our efforts to promote regional infrastructure must 
not be limited to traditional policy measures aimed at attracting investment in infrastructure, 
but must also address policy reform across a number of areas. Thus, institutions and 
governance must play an important complementary role in strengthening Asia’s regional 
infrastructure.  
Given the complexity of institutional reform and the slow pace of improvements in 
governance, progress in infrastructure development is unlikely to be incremental in many 
Asia countries. As such, improving governance at the regional level may be helpful, given 
the possibility of regional diffusion: our results suggest that regional institution and 
                                                  
 
28 Calculated based on Gov and Gov*Asia coefficients estimated under the system-GMM in the equation (3), and 
then added to individual country average governance scores. 
29 To compute the marginal effects of Gov (or the interaction term) I first calculated the derivate of equation (4) 
with respect to Gov (and interaction term), setting all the other variables to their average value, and then I 
tested the hypothesis that the derivate is equal to zero. 
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governance can have a direct and positive effect on the local governance countries in the 
region, subsequently leading to regional infrastructure development.  
An appropriate institutional and policy framework is required for effective governance and 
regional infrastructure development. Developing countries face significant constraints in 
improving governance; at the same time, improving governance requires significant lead 
time and considerable structural adjustments. Poor governance isolates countries from 
international best practice. Regional cooperation can therefore play an important catalytic 
role in improving governance at the national level. By allowing countries to share their 
experiences, regional cooperation can help developing countries learn and benefit from 
regional and international governance.  
Improved governance, particularly at the sectoral level, can carry huge payoffs at a time 
when Asia is looking for higher investments in infrastructure and greater free trade within the 
region. Making Asia “seamless” will thus require complementary policy initiatives by 
countries, regional organizations, and multilateral development organizations in order to 
strengthen governance in institutions in Asia and beyond.  
This study is not without limitations, and a number of issues require further consideration. 
First, future studies are needed to understand the relationship between disaggregated 
governance indicators and regional infrastructure sectors such as power, aviation, ports, 
roads, and railways. Second, an analysis of the causality between governance and 
infrastructure would also be worthwhile. Third, the analysis presented in this paper could be 
verified with new governance indicators from alternative sources. Fourth, it would be helpful 
to explore the manner in which Asian countries can make a positive contribution to improving 
governance in institutions that support regional infrastructure. Finally, a more sophisticated 
dynamic analysis may be attempted to verify the findings of this paper.  
Efforts should be made to collect representative governance indicators which contain better 
information. Developing a capacity building and training tool for policymakers on measuring 
the impact of regional governance on infrastructure development may also be worth 
considering.  
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APPENDIX 1: AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
1996–2007 
The composite governance index (GI) was derived from six aggregate indicators that 
measure perceptions of the following dimensions of governance:  
•  Voice and Accountability (VA) – the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
•  Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) – the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
•  Government Effectiveness (GE) – the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
•  Regulatory Quality (RQ) –the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
•  Rule of Law (RL) –the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society; the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
•  Control of Corruption (CC) – the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
These indicators were constructed using the unobserved components methodology 
described in a series of papers by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). The six governance 
indicators are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better governance outcomes. Detailed information on the dimensions measured by each 
indicator, its components, and the interpretation of the point estimates and standard errors 
can be found in the said papers. The 2008 release of the World Governance Indicators 
incorporates revisions to data for 1996–2006 as well as new data for 2007.  
The governance indicators reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of 
governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Countries' relative 
positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are clearly indicated. 
Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data. 
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APPENDIX 2 
To derive each index, appropriate weights are required for the facilities under each category. 
A basic limitation of the conventional method of indexation is that it assigns ad hoc and fixed 
weights to different facilities that may actually vary over time and space, depending on their 
significance. To overcome this limitation, I have employed the well-known multivariate 
technique called principal component analysis (PCA) (Fruchter 1967). The rationale for using 
PCA is that it helps provide an aggregate representation using various individual indicators. 
Its overall objective is pari passu with homogenizing the overall requirements for individual 
infrastructure facilities across countries.  
Before multiplying them with the respective weights derived from “rotated factor loading” of 
PCA, the raw infrastructure facilities were converted into “unit-free” and “scale-free” values 
divided by the infrastructure values’ (i.e., column-wise) standard deviation, to neutralize the 
heterogeneity due to varied units. One can also convert the raw infrastructure facilities as 
“scale-free,” dividing by country-wise ‘mean’, instead of making it “unit free,” dividing by 
country-wise ‘standard deviation’. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. In this 
study, I have used PCA to select the set of infrastructure variables which can best represent 
the status of infrastructure at the country-level.  
PCA has been used for two purposes: (i) to derive weights for each infrastructure facility, 
and (ii) to eliminate redundant variables and generate a robust index. The construction of the 
infrastructure composite index serves both purposes. In the PCA approach, the first principal 
component is that linear combination of the weighted facilities that explain the maximum of 
variance across the observations at a point in time. One may continue looking at subsequent 
factor loadings until variance is maximized (by looking at scores of Eigen values).  
Factor Loadings of PCA 
  Component 1  Component 2 
Roadways   0.256  0.563 
Railways 0.162  -0.022 
Airports 0.322  0.166 
Seaports 0.503  -0.047 
Telecommunications 0.389  -0.003 
Electricity 0.380  0.003 
Eign value (expl. var.)  3.650  1.543 
Prp. total (%)  0.589  0.702 
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Physical Infrastructure Index (PII) 
Indicators Definition  Source 
Roadways   Road (paved) length per sq. 
km of surface area 
Asian Infrastructure Database 
(AID), based on World 
Development Indicators, 
various issues, and other 
miscellaneous sources. 
Railways  Railway length per sq. km. of 
surface area 
Airports  Air passengers carried per 
100,000 population 
Seaports  Sea cargo (container) carried 
per seaport 
AID, based on Containerization 
International, various issues 
Telecommunications  Telecommunication fixed and 
mobile lines per 10,000 
population 
AID, based on World 
Development Indicators, 
various issues, and other 
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